

***Ireland's industrial trajectory and  
policy: is the crisis a 'critical juncture'?***

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# Is the crisis a catalyst ('critical juncture') in terms of IP?

Crisis has led to recovery industrial strategies in several countries (France) and in the EU *in toto* (see EC, 2010)

IP rediscovered, back in fashion

With crisis, move away from market failure to systemic failure (with emphasis on linkages)

Linkages – inter connection (part of the *zeitgeist* – network firm in spatially confined areas – clusters)

For Ireland in particular, crisis has revealed the fragility of national development policy choice, in particular an over reliance on:

- some industries/sectors (banking, finance, construction and services) over manufacturing
- some ownership forms (foreign/domestic)

# Direct impact of the crisis for Ireland

*Table 1: Selected macroeconomic Indicators (Annual % change and %, respectively; Ireland)*

	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>
(1) Real GDP (annual per cent change)	5.3	5.6	-3.5	-7.5	-0.2	2.2
(2) Current account (per cent of GDP)	-3.5	-5.3	-5.2	-3.0	-2.7	-1.1
(3) CPI (annual per cent change)	2.7	2.9	3.1	-1.7	-1.6	-0.5
(4) General government debt (% of GDP)	24.7	25.0	44.4	65.6	94.2	98.6
(5) Unemployment rate	4.4	4.5	6.4	11.8	13.6	14.5 (#)

(#) Figure for Sept. 2011 y-o-y.

# Direct impact of the crisis for Ireland

At the beginning of the crisis, job losses mostly (1/3) in construction (represented 11.4% of total labour in 2008); ¼ of job losses in manufacturing and about 20% in retail and wholesale trade.

Manufacturing job losses explained by withdrawal of MNC plants (mostly US owned – their derived impact on chain of sub-suppliers and on services)

**Comparative perspective**, manufacturing firms in **Sweden** showed more resilience to the crisis than Irish firms

⇒ a strong indigenous manufacturing base is a necessary condition for sustainable economic growth.

inadequate productive structure', shaped by non-optimal IP choices

# Synopsis of manufacturing sector (CSO, 2011)

Manufacturing sector dwarfed by services (health and financial services)

Manufacturing represents 11% of the total labour force less than financial services (construction: nearly 5%; Services: 65.7 %)

Foreign/ domestic dichotomy (CSO 2010 data):

- employment in traditional sectors (TC, Food, paper products) more likely to be in domestic firms
- foreign firms dominate high-tech sector (Chem: 80% of firms are foreign); machinery and equipment more evenly distributed between foreign and domestic
- foreign firms are more export oriented, enjoy lower labour costs, higher productivity rates

By contrast, in Sweden, more balanced productive fabric (stemming from balanced IP choices)

# IP and innovation policy (pre crisis)

## 1. *Economic Development Plan (1958)*

- EPTR (replaced in 1978 by a 10% corporate tax rate)
- Industrialisation-by-invitation strategy
- Catching-up phase (MNEs from mature sectors; poorly embedded)

## 2. *From early 1970s to early 1990s*

Selective IP (targeted industries: electronics; chemicals)

## 3. *1990s to 2007/2008: high growth rates (Asian 'tiger' style)*

- Importance of DELL Computer Corporation
- Supply chain management (MNEs more embedded); call centres
- Development of a software domestic industry (spillovers)
- Some improvement in terms of innovative input and output

# IP and innovation policy (cont')

BUT this technological progress is *insufficient*.

R&D/GDP = 1.8% in 2009 (was 1.2% in 1999) (OECD indicators)

Researchers per thousand employment = 7.6 in 2009 (above EU27 average of 6.7)

Patent applications: 10 times less than for Sweden (in 2006)

Hewitt-Dundas and Roper (2008) find a steady but *moderate* increase in the proportion of innovation active plants in Ireland over the 1990s

Findings confirmed by the 2010 Innovation Union Scoreboard, which notes a decline for SMEs introducing product or process innovations

Lack of *continuity*

# Innovation performance - Ireland (findings by Hewitt-Dundas and Roper, 2008)

Table 1: Innovation Activity and Innovation Success, Ireland, Northern Ireland and All Island, 1991-2005

	1991-1993	1994-1996	1997-1999	2000-2002	2003-2005
Ireland					
Product Innovators (% of plants)	62.8	65.9	65.3	58.7	67.9
Process Innovators (% of Plants)	n/a	57.7	65.8	53.9	51.0
Sales from New Products (% sales)	30.2	21.9	27.7	24.3	22.6
Sales from New and Improved Products (% sales )	46.4	40.3	40.4	40.3	34.2
Northern Ireland					
Product Innovators (% of plants)	51.9	56.5	58.5	53.8	59.3
Process Innovators (% of Plants)	n/a	46.0	57.5	50.1	53.0
Sales from New Products (% sales)	27.2	22.7	21.3	25.8	24.1
Sales from New and Improved Products (% sales )	48.7	37.5	39.2	38.6	36.8
All Island					
Product Innovators (% of plants)	59.2	62.9	63.3	55.8	64.7
Process Innovators (% of Plants)	n/a	53.9	63.4	52.7	51.8
Sales from New Products (% sales)	29.3	22.2	25.9	24.7	23.1
Sales from New and Improved Products (% sales )	47.1	39.4	40.1	39.8	35.1

Notes and Sources: Observations are weighted to give representative sources. All data from the IIP.

## **Summary** on Ireland's innovation performance (pre-crisis)

Ireland is a 'follower' (2010 Innovation Union Scoreboard)

The analysis rests on 25 research and innovation-related performance indicators. The group of 'followers' comprises also: the UK, Belgium, Austria, Luxembourg, France, Cyprus, Slovenia and Estonia

Relative strengths: human resources, open and attractive research systems

Relative weaknesses: linkages, entrepreneurship, intellectual assets, financial support

But: domestic (manufacturing) industry relatively neglected  
(emphasis on KI services)

# Responses to the crisis – an IP perspective

## Reactions: very limited initiatives:

- enterprise stabilisation fund (K)
- back to work allowance (L)
- Renewed emphasis on attracting US investment (more than ever – ‘quick fix solution’)
- Latest policy documents ‘Towards 2016’ (2006) and *Building Ireland’s Smart Economy* (2008) reiterate the importance of innovation in line with the Lisbon Agenda....

## Conflict between IP and other macroeconomic policies (banking crisis)

- For example, the ‘Smart Economy’ document calls for more investment in public sector research (unachievable)

# Responses to the crisis – an IP perspective

March 2011: Science Foundation Ireland ‘announced’ the allocation of €24m supporting 5 new strategic research clusters (existing commitments)

August 2011: another €15 million provided over 4 years for 79 research projects as part of SFI 2011 (existing commitments)

NB: Picking the winner strategy (ring-fencing of certain areas; more than before)

Drops in the ocean – a lot of uncertainty (very difficult climate for young scientists)

Hewitt-Dundas and Roper (2008) note a disproportionate impact of the economic recession on innovation in Ireland compared to Northern Ireland

Heavy (disproportionate) reliance on inward I will continue for some time

Footloose MNEs; less flexible

Current expenditure prioritised over K expenditure

## ***References***

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